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DETERMINING RIGHTS TO RESELL:
KIRTSAENG V. JOHN WILEY & SONS
SANDRA YOO
I. INTRODUCTION
The “first sale” doctrine allows an owner of a “lawfully made”
copy to further resell his copy without the copyright owner’s
1
permission. The first sale doctrine is one of many statutory
2
limitations imposed on the copyright holder’s exclusive right “to
distribute copies . . . to the public by sale or other transfer of
3
ownership.” This exclusive distribution right is said to “extend[] . . .
4
beyond our borders” through the so-called “importation clause,”
which provides that unauthorized importation is an infringement of
5
the exclusive right to distribute. Because the exclusive right to
distribute is limited by the first sale doctrine, anyone who owns a copy
“lawfully made under this title” is also free to import his copy into the
United States without infringing upon the copyright owner’s right to
6
distribute.
It is well-settled that the first sale doctrine cuts off the copyright
holder’s right to control downstream sales or distributions of copies
7
made in the United States. Additionally, the Supreme Court held


2014 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 2013).
2. Id. §§ 107–122; see id. § 106 (stating the exclusive rights listed are “subject to sections
107 through 122”).
3. Id. § 106(3).
4. Brief for Petitioner at 17, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. July
2, 2012).
5. 17 U.S.C.A. § 602(a).
6. Id. § 109(a); Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135,
144–45 (1998) (explaining that the importation clause does not prohibit lawful owners of
copyrighted works from reselling or importing those works into the United States because the
importation clause is limited to the exclusive rights in section 106, and accordingly, subject to
the first sale doctrine of section 109).
7. See Quality King, 523 U.S. at 140–43 (explaining that the exclusive right to distribute is
applicable only to the first sale of the copyrighted work); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.
339, 350 (1908) (“It is not denied that one who has sold a copyrighted article, without
restriction, has parted with all right to control the sale of it.”).
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unanimously in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research
8
International, Inc. that the first sale doctrine also cuts off the right to
control downstream sales or distributions of imported copies so long
9
as the imported copy was first made in the United States. Although
the first sale doctrine has been recognized and discussed by the
10
Supreme Court as early as 1908, one aspect of the doctrine remains
unanswered: does the first sale doctrine apply to foreign-made
copies? Specifically, must a copy be manufactured within the United
11
States to be considered “lawfully made under” copyright law?
12
In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court must
decide whether the first sale doctrine applies to foreign-made copies.
The extent of the first sale doctrine is of increasing concern given
technological advances that allow parties to lawfully buy and sell
13
across geographic boundaries. In the age of online markets like eBay,
Amazon, and Craigslist, savvy buyers and sellers connect, inquire,
bargain, and transact in an economically efficient “gray market,”
14
regardless of geographic lines and local supply and demand.
Although the economic impact of further limiting or expanding
the first sale doctrine is both deep and wide—with voiced concerns
15
16
ranging from consumer markets to museums and even to
17
neighborhood yard sales —these economic concerns are extraneous

8. 523 U.S. 135 (1998); id. at 151–53.
9. Id. at 145 (“After the first sale of a copyrighted item ‘lawfully made under this title,’
any subsequent purchaser, whether from a domestic or from a foreign reseller, is obviously an
‘owner’ of that item.”); see also John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 217 (2d Cir.
2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697) (“In a unanimous opinion,
the Supreme Court held that § 109(a), operating in combination with § 106(3), does in fact limit
the scope of § 602(a) [the “Importation Clause”].”).
10. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350.
11. 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a).
12. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. argued Oct. 29, 2012).
13. Greg Stohr, Discounted ‘Gray Market’ Goods Draw Top U.S. Court Review,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 16, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0416/discounted-gray-market-goods-draw-top-u-s-court-review.html (discussing the billion-dollar
“gray market” where foreign-made products are bought at a discount and subsequently sold
within the United States for a profit).
14. Id.
15. Jennifer Waters, Your Right to Resell Your Own Stuff is in Peril, MARKETWATCH.COM
(Oct. 12, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-10-12/finance/34240922_1_copyrightiphone-consumer-groups.
16. Lisa Shuchman, U.S. Museums Concerned About Unartful Impact of SCOTUS
(Oct.
17,
2012),
Copyright
Case,
LAW.COM
http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202575170197&US_Museums_Co
ncerned_About_Unartful_Impact_of_SCOTUS_Copyright_Case&slreturn=20120917103608.
17. Tom Gara, Is Your Neighbor’s Yard Sale Illegal? Let the Supreme Court Decide,
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18

to interpreting the Copyright Act. Instead, the analysis must center
19
20
on the statutory text itself. Because the statute is ambiguous,
context and canons of statutory interpretation must guide proper
21
analysis. Ultimately, the location of manufacture should be irrelevant
and the first sale doctrine should apply to copies made abroad.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Supap Kirtsaeng, a native of Thailand, moved to the United States
in 1997 to study mathematics at Cornell University and continued
22
into a Ph.D. program at the University of Southern California. To
help subsidize his education costs, Kirtsaeng asked his friends and
family in Thailand to purchase and ship him textbooks locally
published by the Asian subsidiary of a U.S. publisher, John Wiley &
23
Sons. These Thailand-manufactured textbooks were intended by the
publisher to be sold and distributed within Asia, as manifested by its
24
authorization legend. After researching the first sale doctrine online,
however, Kirtsaeng understood “that it was legal for him to sell
international editions of books in the United States so long as he
25
legally purchased them abroad.”
After Kirtsaeng’s friends and family bought and shipped him
these textbooks, he resold them to students in the United States using
26
websites like eBay. Kirtsaeng used the payments to reimburse his

WSJ.COM (Oct. 4, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2012/10/04/isyour-neighbours-yard-sale-illegal-let-the-supreme-court-decide/.
18. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 153 (1998)
(“[W]hether or not we think it would be wise policy to provide statutory protection for such
price discrimination is not a matter that is relevant to our duty to interpret the text of the
Copyright Act.”).
19. See, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984) (emphasizing that statutory
analysis begins with determining the ordinary and plain meaning of the language employed by
Congress).
20. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 220 (2d Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132
S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697) (“The relevant text is simply unclear. ‘[L]awfully
made under this title’ could plausibly be interpreted to mean any number of things.”).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 492 (1997) (observing that Congress’s
intentional bill revision “confirms the natural reading” of the statute).
22. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 213; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. Dec. 5, 2011) (No. 11-697).
23. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 212–13.
24. Id. at 213. An authorization legend details restrictions on exportation to unauthorized
regions and the publisher’s rights to take legal action to recover damages and costs as needed to
enforce its rights.
25. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 3.
26. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 213.
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family and friends for shipping costs and kept the remaining profits
27
for himself.
John Wiley & Sons, which sells academic textbooks both
domestically and internationally, commenced suit against Kirtsaeng in
2008 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
28
New York, claiming copyright infringement of eight textbooks. The
jury ultimately found Kirtsaeng liable for willful copyright
infringement for all eight works in question and imposed damages of
29
$75,000 for each of the eight works. Kirtsaeng appealed, claiming the
court erred in holding that the first sale doctrine defense was
30
unavailable. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the first sale doctrine “does not apply to copies manufactured
outside of the United States,” a holding at odds with both the Third
31
and Ninth Circuits’ interpretations of the first sale doctrine.
Given the circuit split as well as the Second Circuit’s own split32
panel decision, it is no surprise this unresolved issue has returned to
33
the Supreme Court for final resolution.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A unanimous Supreme Court explained in Quality King that,
“[t]he whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright
owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling
it, he has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its
34
distribution.” In that case, the Supreme Court aimed to clarify the
first sale doctrine as it relates to imported copies in order to resolve a
35
circuit split. L’anza, the copyright owner, manufactured and sold hair
care products affixed with copyrighted labels to both domestic and
27. Id.
28. Id. at 212–13, 215.
29. Id. at 215.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 224; see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 22, at 10 (contrasting the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that the first sale doctrine applies to a foreign-made copy once it has
been authorized for sale within the United States with the Second Circuit’s holding that the first
sale doctrine never applies to a foreign-made copy even if the copy is imported with the
copyright owner’s permission).
32. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d at 211.
33. See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curiam)
(affirming a Ninth Circuit case holding that the first sale doctrine does not apply to foreignmade goods unless the goods were previously imported and sold in the United States with the
copyright holder’s permission).
34. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998).
35. Id. at 140.
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foreign distributors. Products intended for distribution in foreign
markets eventually “found their way back to the United States”
without L’anza’s permission and were resold by Quality King
37
Distributors at discounted prices. L’anza sued, alleging the
importation and subsequent resales infringed on its exclusive right to
distribute; Quality King raised the first sale doctrine defense, arguing
L’anza had authorized the first sale of the products to the foreign
distributor and thus exhausted any further control over downstream
38
sales.
The Ninth Circuit held that the first sale doctrine could not apply
to these products because otherwise the importation clause would be
39
rendered “meaningless.” The Supreme Court expressly rejected this
position and stated that the first sale doctrine “does not subsume” the
importation clause and these “provisions retain significant
40
independent meaning.” For example, the Court stated the
importation clause in section 602(a) provides a “private remedy
41
against the importer.” Additionally, the first sale doctrine does not
apply “to a § 602(a) action against any nonowner such as a bailee, a
licensee, a consignee, or one whose possession of the copy was
42
unlawful.”
The Quality King decision only resolved the circuit split for
copyrighted items involved in a “round trip” journey; it did not
“resolve cases in which the allegedly infringing imports were
43
manufactured abroad.” It is precisely this unanswered question that
brings the first sale doctrine back to the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng.
The Court recently left this same question unanswered in Costco
44
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., another Ninth Circuit case, by
45
simply affirming the lower court’s decision in a per curiam opinion.
Omega manufactures watches in Switzerland bearing a copyrighted
“Omega Globe Design” and sells these watches to authorized

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id. at 139–40.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (per curiam).
Id.
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distributors and retailers both in the United States and abroad. The
watches in question changed hands several times before Costco
47
ultimately purchased and resold them to its customers. Omega sued,
alleging Costco, as an unauthorized retailer, infringed upon its
48
exclusive right to distribute by reselling the watches.
Although it recognized that the first sale doctrine limits a
copyright holder’s exclusive right to distribute and import, Omega
argued that the first sale doctrine does not apply to foreign49
manufactured goods, and the Ninth Circuit agreed. Costco appealed,
arguing the first sale doctrine cuts off Omega’s ability to control its
downstream sales, but the Supreme Court did not issue an opinion on
50
the matter. Without a definitive ruling on the issue, the limits of the
first sale doctrine and its possible interaction with the importation
51
clause has been raised once again.
IV. RULING BELOW
In a 2-1 panel split, the Second Circuit majority held that the first
52
sale doctrine does not apply to foreign-made goods. The court first
discussed the apparent “tension” between the importation clause and
53
the first sale doctrine. Although the importation clause of section
602(a) provides copyright holders some control over importation of
copies, the first sale doctrine cuts off any such control after an initial
54
sale. The court emphasized the independence of these two provisions
55
as previously detailed by the Supreme Court in Quality King.
Because the Supreme Court has yet to rule on whether the first
sale doctrine applies to foreign-made copies, the Second Circuit next
56
looked to textual analysis. The court focused on the words “made”
and “under” to determine whether foreign-made copies are “lawfully

46. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008).
47. Id. at 984. “Unidentified third parties” bought the Omega watches from authorized
dealers and sold them to ENE Limited in New York, who then sold the watches to Costco. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 983, 985.
50. See Costco, 131 S. Ct. at 565 (affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision in a per curiam
decision).
51. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 212 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697).
52. Id. at 211, 222.
53. Id. at 217.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 218.
56. Id.
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57

made under” the Copyright Act. Without appropriate statutory
58
definitions, the court looked to context to guide its interpretation.
Although the court found that “lawfully made under this title” could
be consistent with “lawfully made in the United States,” it also noted
59
that the Copyright Act includes at least some foreign-made works.
For example, section 104(b)(2) extends copyright protection to works
first published in the United States or in any foreign nation that is a
60
treaty party on the date of first publication. Thus, the Second Circuit
determined that a textual analysis alone did not definitively support
61
any particular interpretation.
Because the text of section 109(a) is “utterly ambiguous” the
Second Circuit resorted to an interpretation it thought “best
comport[ed]” with both the importation clause and the Supreme
62
Court’s holding in Quality King. In particular, the Second Circuit
relied heavily on the following hypothetical from Quality King:
If the author of [a] work gave the exclusive United States
distribution rights–enforceable under the Act–to the publisher of
the United States edition and the exclusive British distribution
rights to the publisher of the British edition, . . . presumably only
those [copies] made by the publisher of the U.S. edition would be
“lawfully made under this title” within the meaning of § 109(a).
The first sale doctrine would not provide the publisher of the
British edition who decided to sell in the American market with a
defense to an action under § 602(a) (or, for that matter, to an
63
action under § 106(3), if there was a distribution of the copies).

From this passage, the Second Circuit stated that “the Court suggests
that copyrighted material manufactured abroad cannot be subject to
64
the first sale doctrine.” This passage, along with the ambiguity of the
statutory text and the “necessary interplay” with the importation
clause, supported the Second Circuit’s holding that the first sale
65
doctrine only applies to domestic-made copies.

57. Id. at 218–19; 17 U.S.C.A. § 109(a) (West 2013).
58. Id. at 219.
59. Id. at 220.
60. Id. at 219.
61. Id. at 220.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 218 (quoting Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 148 (1998)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 221.
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The majority’s opinion is at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s recent
holding in Omega. In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that the first
sale doctrine does apply to foreign-manufactured works once these
works have been sold or authorized for sale in the United States by
66
the copyright holder. In contrast, the Second Circuit’s holding means
that a copyrighted work manufactured abroad would never fall within
67
the first sale doctrine. That means the copyright owner could
continue to control downstream sales merely because the work was
68
manufactured abroad. Thus, lacking proper guidance, the Second
Circuit has created another independent ruling on the first sale
doctrine, complicating what should be national conformity under U.S.
copyright law.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Kirtsaeng’s Arguments
Kirtsaeng argues that foreign-made copies are considered
“lawfully made under” copyright law based primarily on textual
analysis and the negative implications of upholding an opposing
interpretation.
He argues that any ordinary or natural reading of “lawfully made
under this title” means a lawful copy is made “in accordance with” the
69
statute. As Kirtsaeng points out, the Court has already interpreted
the phrase “under this title” to mean “according to” that title in
70
construing a state administrative claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
To read in any geographic limitation such as “made in the United
States” or “made where United States law applies” would be
unnatural where geographic references are wholly absent from the
71
statute.
Additionally,
Kirtsaeng
argues
that
his
so-called
“nondiscriminatory” definition, meaning that the place of
manufacture is immaterial, is consistent with the Copyright Act’s

66. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 983 (9th Cir. 2008).
67. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 222 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 1905 (U.S. Apr. 16, 2012) (No. 11-697) (“In sum, we hold that the phrase ‘lawfully
made under this Title’ in § 109(a) refers specifically and exclusively to copies that are made in
territories in which the Copyright Act is law, and not to foreign-manufactured works.”).
68. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 10.
69. Id. at 26–27.
70. Id. at 27 (citing N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980)).
71. Id. at 27–29.
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“explicit embrace of foreign subject matter.” Section 104 defines the
subject matter of the Copyright Act in “the most expansive
73
international terms imaginable.” For example, all unpublished
original works, derivatives, and compilations are “subject to
protection under this title without regard to the nationality or domicile
74
of the author.” Published works are similarly accorded “expansive
75
geographic sweep” under section 104(b). Thus, because domestic and
international works are both covered “under this title,” a
nondiscriminatory reading of the first sale doctrine is consistent with
the geographically limitless subject matter scope of the Copyright
76
Act.
Kirtsaeng argues further that his nondiscriminatory definition best
accommodates repeated uses of the phrases “lawfully made under this
77
title” and “under this title” throughout the rest of the Copyright Act.
Adopting a nondiscriminatory definition is consistent with the six
appearances of “lawfully made under this title” as well as the ninetyone appearances of “under this title” used throughout the Copyright
78
Act.
Finally, Kirtsaeng emphasizes the negative implications that would
result if the Second Circuit’s opinion is affirmed. Notably, foreign
manufacturing would be encouraged over domestic manufacturing
because U.S. copyright holders would be afforded much greater
protection merely because copies are manufactured abroad. This
incentive cannot be what Congress intended. In fact, Kirtsaeng asserts
that “Congress reaffirmed its commitment” to a nondiscriminatory
definition of the first sale doctrine “upon every amendment to the
Copyright Act, which occurred over 30 times between 1909 and 1976,
and there was never an argument that the first-sale defense applied
79
only to U.S.-made copies.” Moreover, Kirtsaeng points to the
presumption that Congress would have explicitly denoted a
80
geographic limitation if that was in fact its intention. He also points
to the presumption that changes to the effect of law will not be

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 29–32.
Id. at 30; 17 U.S.C.A. § 104 (West 2013).
17 U.S.C.A. § 104(a) (emphasis added).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 30; 17 U.S.C.A. § 104(b).
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 31.
Id. at 32–37.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 27–29.
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81

inferred “unless such intention is clearly expressed.”
B. The Publisher’s Arguments

The publisher contends that foreign-made copies are not “lawfully
made under this title” by advancing a textual analysis as well as
pointing to policy issues. According to the publisher, only those copies
that were made “in conformance with the Copyright Act where the
82
Copyright Act is applicable” are “lawfully made under this title.” This
is because the activity must be “actually governed” by the statute in
83
order for it to be “under” the particular provision. The activity
referred to in the first sale doctrine is the physical making of the copy.
If the copy is made where the Copyright Act is not applicable, then
84
that copy is not made “under” U.S. copyright law. Thus the publisher
concedes that “under this title” cannot by itself impose a geographic
85
restriction to copies made “in the United States.” Rather, because
the “Copyright Act does not apply outside the United States,” the
copy must be made where U.S. copyright law applies for it to be
86
lawfully made “under” U.S. copyright law.
The publisher supports this view by referencing the Court’s
87
hypothetical presented in Quality King. In Quality King, the Court
“recognized that copies may be made either ‘under the United States
Copyright Act,’ or ‘under the law of some other country,’ but not
88
‘under’ both.”
The publisher then reasons that “foreignmanufactured copies are ‘lawfully made’ under foreign law and
89
cannot be made under the Copyright Act.”
Additionally, the publisher argues that foreign-made copies
cannot fall within the first sale doctrine without depriving the
90
importation clause of “any meaningful effect.” Because the
importation clause allows copyright holders to segment international
markets, this right would be rendered ineffective if foreign copies
81. Id. at 49 (quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 554 (1989)).
82. Brief for Respondent at 15, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S.
Aug. 31, 2012).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 15–16.
85. Id. at 1617.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 17–20.
88. Id. at 18 (quoting Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 147 (1998)).
89. Id. at 20.
90. Id. at 22–26.
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could be imported into the United States without the copyright
91
holder’s permission.
The publisher then points to thirty years of Congress’s
acquiescence as proof that foreign-made copies are not covered by
92
the first sale doctrine. Notably, Congress has, on several occasions,
amended the text of the first sale doctrine without addressing foreignmade copies while lower courts have held that the foreign-made
93
copies are not privy to the first sale defense. Because the Court has
“recognized that Congress’ failure to disturb a consistent judicial
interpretation of a statute may provide some indication that
‘Congress at least acquiesces in, and apparently affirms, that
[interpretation,]’” the publisher contends that Congress’s inaction in
changing the relevant text supports its reading of the first sale
94
doctrine.
Finally, the publisher emphasizes that the Court has said
“copyright law celebrates the profit motive, recognizing that the
incentive to profit from the exploitation of copyrights will redound to
95
the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of knowledge.”
Thus the efforts to segment international markets should not be
obliterated by an expansive definition of the first sale doctrine, a
96
definition unsupported by the statutory text.
C. Oral Arguments
At oral argument, the Justices focused less on textual analysis and
much more on the practical implications of a ruling. The Justices
particularly challenged the “consequences” of upholding the lower
97
court’s decision “as a matter of common sense.” For example, Justice
Breyer questioned whether “the millions of Americans who buy
Toyotas” built with various copyrighted electronics could lawfully
resell their vehicles without “getting the permission of the copyright

91. Id.
92. Id. at 35–38.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Id. at 36 (quoting Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 336 (1988)
(alteration in original)).
95. Id. at 49 (quoting Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
96. Id. at 46–49.
97. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697
(U.S. Oct. 29, 2012).
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98

holder of every item in that car which is copyrighted.” Similarly,
Justice Ginsburg raised the issue of “inviting the outsourcing of
manufacturing jobs” if foreign-manufactured goods are said to be
99
outside the first sale doctrine’s scope.
The Justices also frequently raised the hypothetical from Quality
King, the same hypothetical heavily relied upon by the Second Circuit
in determining that the first sale doctrine did not apply to foreignmade copies. Counsel for Kirtsaeng stated that the passage is simply
100
dicta, but is not completely incongruous with his position. In
contrast, counsel for the publisher argued that the hypothetical is not
dicta but the holding of the case in the sense that it was “a necessary
101
ingredient” to decide the case.
Deputy Solicitor General Malcolm Stewart appeared on behalf of
the United States in support of the publisher and argued for its socalled “Bobbs-Merrill argument” which at heart requires Quality King
102
to be overturned. However, Chief Justice Roberts characterized the
Government’s proffered interpretive guide as “an awfully difficult
103
maze” and seemed to favor a simpler approach.
VI. ANALYSIS
As the Court stated in Quality King, “[i]n construing the
statute, . . . we must remember that its principal purpose was to
104
promote the progress of the ‘useful Arts,’ by rewarding creativity.”
Surely this “creativity” refers to creativity in the constitutionally
protected “useful Arts,” not “creativity” in contriving copyright laws
105
for economic gain.
If the Court interprets the first sale doctrine while remembering
this principle, Kirtsaeng will likely emerge victorious. The Court will
need to address the competing interests of copyright holders and
106
society. A copyright holder is interested primarily in protecting his
works from “exploitation” while society is interested in “the free flow

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 48.
Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998).
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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107

of ideas.” Here, that means balancing the economic interests of a
publisher seeking to segment international markets with the interests
of, for example, students seeking to purchase new or used textbooks
needed for their education.
Certainly the publisher has the exclusive right to distribute or
refrain from distributing its copies; however, that right is cut off as
soon as the publisher authorizes a first sale of any copy “lawfully
108
made under” U.S. copyright law. Despite the fact that the copy was
physically manufactured abroad, the U.S. publisher authorized its
subsidiary to create that copy. Thus the copy should be considered
“lawfully made under this title” because an authorized copy is a
109
lawful copy. The textbooks were subsequently sold to and lawfully
purchased by Kirtsaeng’s friends and family. It is at this moment that
the first sale doctrine instantaneously cuts off the publisher’s right to
control downstream sales. These copies have been placed “in the
stream of commerce by selling [them]” so the publisher has
“exhausted [its] exclusive statutory right to control . . . distribution [of
110
the copies].”
There is no issue of extraterritorial reach in adopting Kirtsaeng’s
position because the publisher is seeking to enforce a right under U.S.
111
law over sales made in the United States to other U.S. customers.
Moreover, the Court has already stated that there is no
extraterritorial reach for an owner of a lawfully made copy to raise
the first sale doctrine in a U.S. court regardless of whether the first
112
sale occurred domestically or abroad.
Because the text is ambiguous, the Court should consider
legislative history to guide its interpretation. The amicus brief
submitted by twenty-five intellectual property law professors
persuasively points to legislative history that favors a
113
nondiscriminatory reading of the first sale doctrine. Interpretation
107. Id.
108. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106(3), 109(a) (West 2013).
109. Id. §109(a); id. § 106 (defining exclusive rights to include the right “to authorize”).
110. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 152.
111. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 4, at 48.
112. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 145 n.14 (“Such protection does not require the
extraterritorial application of the Act any more than § 602(a)’s ‘acquired abroad’ language
does.”).
113. See generally Brief of 25 Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. July 9, 2012)
[hereinafter Brief of 25 Intellectual Property Law Professors] (explaining the broader context
behind section 109(a) through common law and legislative history).
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of a statute that “covers an issue previously governed by the common
114
law” is presumed to “retain the substance of the common law.” The
foundational common law principle in the first sale doctrine is
alienation of personal property which does not “depend in any way
115
on the place of manufacture.” The first codification of the first sale
doctrine was in section 41 of the Copyright Act of 1909, a provision
116
devoid of any geographic references or limitations. In fact, the bill’s
accompanying House Report said section 41 was “not intended to
change in any way existing law” and Congress recognized it would be
“most unwise to permit the copyright proprietor to exercise any
control whatsoever over the article which is the subject of copyright
117
after said proprietor has made the first sale.” When the phrase
“lawfully made under this title” was added in 1976, the accompanying
House Report again stated that the revision was to “restate[] and
118
confirm[]” the traditional first sale doctrine.
Even putting relevant legislative history aside, it is hard to imagine
that Congress would have intended to treat the same good differently
119
under copyright law, merely because of where it was manufactured.
For example, in 1976 Congress repealed a manufacturing provision
which explicitly granted greater copyright protection to U.S.manufactured copies so that protection would not be affected by
120
place of manufacture. To now hold that copyright holders are given
more protection based on the place of manufacture would be to
completely ignore Congress’s recent actions to correct provisions
inconsistent with the rest of the Copyright Act.

114. Id. at 10 (quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2289 n.13 (2010)).
115. Id. at 12; see Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093,
1096 (3d Cir. 1988) (“The first sale rule is statutory, but finds its origins in the common law
aversion to limiting the alienation of personal property.”).
116. Brief of 25 Intellectual Property Law Professors, supra note 113, at 16.
117. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 19 (1909)).
118. Id. at 3 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79 (1976) (omissions in original)).
119. Ronald Mann, Argument Preview: Court Tries Again on Copyright Importation
(Oct.
18,
2012,
10:41
AM),
Problem,
SCOTUSBLOG.COM
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/argument-preview-court-tries-again-on-copyrightimportation-problem/ (“The idea that Congress’s codification of the first-sale doctrine in
Section 109 was intended to elevate protection for foreign works above the protection for
wholly domestic works is so out of line with that well-documented historical sensibility as to be
‘inconceivable.’”).
120. Brief of Amicus Curiae Costco Wholesale Corp. in Support of Petitioner at 5, 24–26,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-697 (U.S. July 9, 2012).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Court has said that the “whole point” of the first sale doctrine
is to cut off a copyright holder’s exclusive right to control downstream
121
sales of a copy once it has been sold. In Kirtsaeng, there is no
question that the copies were lawfully sold. However, the question
that remains is whether these copies must be made in the United
States in order for the first sale doctrine to apply. The Justices have a
second opportunity to answer that question and will likely do so with
thorough analysis, wading through textual analyses and policy
concerns to appease the various interested parties who have been
waiting for clarity since Omega.

121. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 (1998)
(“The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once the copyright owner places a
copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive
statutory right to control its distribution.”).

